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AFTER JULIANA: A PROPOSAL FOR THE NEXT
ATMOSPHERIC TRUST LITIGATION STRATEGY
KACIE COUCH*
[W]hatever measures have a tendency to dissolve the Union,
or contribute to violate or lessen the Sovereign Authority,
ought to be considered as hostile to the Liberty and Inde-
pendency of America[.]1
INTRODUCTION
The cliffs of California are dissolving.2 Glaciers in Colorado and
Montana are dissolving.3 Islands in Louisiana and Alaska are dissolving.4
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2021; Managing Editor, Environmental
Law and Policy Review, Volume 45; BA Environmental Sociology, Colorado State University,
2018, summa cum laude. This Note would not have seen the light of day without the
invaluable advice of my Articles Editor, Chase Corey, and the hard work of ELPR’s
Volume 45 staff, who have excelled at the herculean task of editing virtually while in the
midst of a global pandemic. Thank you. Additional thanks to Professor Allison Orr Larsen
for being my sounding board when in peril of preemption. Finally, a huge thank you to
Professor Lynda Butler, who has inspired—and greatly improved—my law school trajec-
tory in so many ways.
1 President George Washington, Circular Letter of Farewell to the Army (June 8, 1783)
(emphasis added), quoted in Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1178 (9th Cir. 2020)
(Stanton, J., dissenting).
2 See Sea Level Rise Could Double Erosion Rates of Southern California Coastal Cliffs,
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. (July 9, 2018), https://www.usgs.gov/news/sea-level-rise-could
-double-erosion-rates-southern-california-coastal-cliffs [https://perma.cc/S4SZ-VGHZ].
3 See Oliver Milman, US Glacier National Park Losing Its Glaciers with Just 26 of 150
Left, GUARDIAN (May 11, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/may/11
/us-glacier-national-park-is-losing-its-glaciers-with-just-26-of-150-left [https://perma.cc
/K8R6-BVSP] (“It’s inevitable that we will lose [every glacier in the contiguous U.S.] over
the next few decades. . . . The Colorado glaciers started melting before Montana’s and
while there are larger glaciers in the Pacific north-west that will hold on longer, the number
vanishing will steadily grow until none are left.”).
4 See, e.g., Madeline Stano, Fighting for Home in the Melting Arctic, 15VT.J.ENV’TL.744, 746
(2014) (chronicling the impacts of climate change on the Alaskan Native Village of Kivalina,
an island slated to become uninhabitable by 2025); Carol Davenport & Campbell Robertson,
Resettling the First American ‘Climate Refugees’, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2016) (discussing the
resettlement of America’s first climate change refugees: the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw
Indians of Isle de Jean Charles, Louisiana), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/us/re
settling-the-first-american-climate-refugees.html [https://perma.cc/7KTR-TEDH]; see also
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America as we know it is dissolving; twenty-one youth plaintiffs that face
a future with less liberty and independence than generations before them
claim that federal government inaction in the face of climate change is to
blame.5 Those plaintiffs, in the landmark case Juliana v. United States,
sought judicial declaration of a federal public trust and substantive due
process right to a stable climate system.6 In proceedings, Judge Anne Aiken
of the District Court of Oregon declared a newly recognized fundamental
right to a habitable climate and a federal public trust in the atmosphere
in favor of the plaintiffs,7 but in a recent two-to-one decision the Ninth
Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss, holding that
the plaintiffs lacked standing before the court.8
Juliana exemplifies just one of the growing number of Atmospheric
Trust Litigation suits that have steadily gained recognition throughout
the United States (and throughout the world)9 in the past decade.10 At-
mospheric Trust Litigation, or ATL, is a litigation strategy that seeks to
utilize the courts to compel the government to more effectively regulate
and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.11 Specifically, litigants hope to com-
pel reduction of carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions to atmospheric levels
Suzanne Goldenberg, America’s Climate Refugees: The At Risk List, GUARDIAN, https://
www.theguardian.com/environment/interactive/2013/may/14/alaska-villages-frontline -
global-warming [https://perma.cc/QJR3-BMJ2] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020) (mapping Alaskan
native communities at immediate risk of displacement or harm due to climate change).
5 See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2–3, Juliana v.
United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020)
[hereinafter Juliana Complaint], available at https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571d
109b04426270152febe0/t/57a35ac5ebbd1ac03847eece/1470323398409/YouthAmended
ComplaintAgainstUS.pdf [https://perma.cc/584W-ZCTN].
6 Id. at 99.
7 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250, 1259 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d, 947 F.3d
1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
8 Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1175 (9th Cir. 2020).
9 For an example of one of the many international ATL cases that have emerged or are
currently underway, see La Rose v. Her Majesty the Queen, in which fifteen Canadian
youth plaintiffs claim that Queen Elizabeth and the Canadian government have con-
tributed to an unsustainable climate system, violating the youths’ rights under the Charter
of Freedom, and seeking remedy in a court order to implement a Climate Recovery Plan.
Statement of Claim to the Defendants at 55–60, La Rose v. Her Majesty the Queen, No. T-
175 0-19 (Oct. 25, 2019) (Can.), available at http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-
change -litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2019/20191025_T-
1750 -19_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CEM-TDKY].
10 See MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, 226–28 (2014) [hereinafter NATURE’S
TRUST]; State Legal Actions, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org
/state-legal-actions [https://perma.cc/B7UQ-XK48] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
11 See NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 10, at 221. For more on ATL, see infra Section I.B.
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under 350 parts per million, which scientists believe could minimize the
effects of climate change that will otherwise disproportionately impact
future generations.12
While the plaintiffs’ loss in Juliana might seem bitter to those who
wholeheartedly believe in ATL’s objective, this Note argues that Juliana’s
loss might more appropriately be described as bittersweet. A favorable
determination under the plaintiffs’ pleadings could conceivably have pro-
duced an unwelcome remedy: federal preemption over state public trust
doctrines.13 Stemming from the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, the
doctrine of preemption stands for the principle that federal law supplants
any state law or regulation that is “inconsistent” with federal law.14 Should
a federal public trust be found to exist that is at odds with state defini-
tions of the public trust, many issues of preemption could arise. For
example, preemption of state authority over the public trust could hinder
cooperative environmental federalism and erode principles of state sover-
eignty by impairing states’ abilities to regulate traditional state uses of
waterways and other public trust resources.15 Furthermore, preemption
could prevent individuals from advancing certain common law environ-
mental claims in federal court.16
Therefore, Atmospheric Trust Litigation remains risky if wielded
improperly, as Juliana arguably did—but that does not preclude ATL’s
beneficial use in future lawsuits. In consideration of the issues raised in
Juliana, this Note argues for a revision of the Atmospheric Trust Litigation
strategy in federal court. This proposed revision will more effectively
protect the common law rights of individuals and preserve state law while
simultaneously compelling recognition of a federal substantive due
process right to a livable atmosphere through a state special solicitude
case.17
In Part I, this Note discusses the principles behind the public trust
doctrine and details the current state of Atmospheric Trust Litigation,
ending with an analysis of the Juliana decision. Part II argues that the
Ninth Circuit ruled correctly in Juliana, because recognition of a federal
public trust could endanger principles of federalism and put at risk the
more fundamental objective that Atmospheric Trust Litigation plaintiffs
fight for. This Note then offers potential revisions to federal Atmospheric
12 Juliana Complaint, supra note 5, at 2–5.
13 See infra Section II.A.
14 Preemption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see infra Section II.A.
15 See infra Section II.C.
16 See infra Section II.B.
17 See infra Part III.
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Trust Litigation pleadings that could remedy those issues. Part III lays
the foundation for a state special solicitude Atmospheric Trust Litigation
case, building on what has been learned from Juliana and prior Atmo-
spheric Trust Litigation cases, that would meet the elements of standing
after the Juliana decision and could pave the path to a cleaner, healthier
atmosphere for current and future generations.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF ATMOSPHERIC TRUST LITIGATION
Atmospheric Trust Litigation cannot be discussed properly without
first ensuring readers’ sufficient understanding of the public trust doc-
trine. Therefore, before detailing the current state of ATL, this Note will
take a short detour through a discussion of the Roman and American
history of the public trust.
A. The Public Trust Doctrine
In the United States, the public trust has been defined as a matter
of state law.18 The public trust doctrine limits sovereign power by requir-
ing the state to hold title in trust to submerged lands under navigable
waters, to allow for public use of the trust resources in fishing, naviga-
tion, and commerce, and to prevent any alienation of the trust resources
that might otherwise be a detriment to the public interest.19
Though the public trust doctrine exists as a basic principal of state
law in each of the fifty states, it did not originate in America, nor does it
survive here exclusively.20 The doctrine was first introduced to the
Americas by English colonists, whose public trust rights were codified in
the Magna Carta.21 When America became its own nation, the public
trust doctrine was subsequently incorporated into American law through
the equal footing doctrine.22 It is insufficient, however, to merely examine
18 PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012) (stating in dicta that “the public
trust doctrine remains a matter of state law”).
19 See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475–78 (1970) (the most widely recognized
authority on the modern public trust doctrine, discussing the nature of the public trust).
20 See Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the Public Trust Doctrine:
Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion Vision,
45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 741, 741–43 (2012).
21 Carolyn Kelly, Where the Water Meets the Sky: How an Unbroken Line of Precedent from
Justinian to Juliana Supports the Possibility of a Federal Atmospheric Public Trust Doc-
trine, 27 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 184, 187 (2019).
22 The equal footing doctrine stands for “[t]he principle that a state admitted to the Union
after 1789 enters with the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction within its borders
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the public trust’s colonial roots in this country, as the doctrine’s origin
long predates colonialism.23 The genesis of England’s inclusion of the
public trust in its Magna Carta derived from legal foundations set forth
in the Institutes of Justinian, a Roman treatise written in the sixth cen-
tury.24 The Institutes of Justinian is often cited as the foundation of the
public trust doctrine, but recent scholarship suggests that the doctrine
likely originated centuries earlier.25 Thus, not unlike the ancient Romans,
the public trust doctrine has had an impressively long and prolific ex-
istence, the impact of which continues to influence the law in many
countries of Latin or colonial descent nearly two thousand years later.26
The public trust doctrine’s longevity is a testament to its inherent
flexibility and ability to adapt as societies progress.27 In fact, between the
formation of the original public trust and its contemporary American com-
mon law interpretation, the doctrine has been adapted and recast by some
of the world’s most successful western empires “in order to meet [those
societies’] contemporary needs.”28 The historical malleability of the public
trust doctrine suggests that the public trust is best viewed as an ever-
evolving (and typically court-led) institution whose function is to main-
tain and promote normative sovereignty over ecological resources.29
Normative sovereignty over ecological resources is likely to look
a lot different in the age of environmentalism and climate change than it
as did the original 13 states.” Equal-Footing Doctrine, BLACK’SLAWDICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019). For the canonical Supreme Court case explaining the incorporation of the public
trust in American law through the equal-footing doctrine, see Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S.
1, 27–28 (1894).
23 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & Thomas McGinn, The Roman Public Trust Doctrine: What Was
It, and Does It Support an Atmospheric Trust?, 47 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 1–2 (forthcoming
2020); Kelly, supra note 21, at 187.
24 JUSTINIAN,INSTITUTES§ 2.1.1 (J.B. Moyle trans., Oxford 1911) (“[T]he following things are
by natural law common to all—the air, running water, the sea and consequently the
seashore”).
25 Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 23, at 56 (“There is more than one Roman ancestor of the [pub-
lic trust doctrine]. The tradition is both older and more varied than previously thought”).
26 See generally Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 20 (outlining approaches to the public trust
doctrine taken in India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa,
Brazil, Ecuador, and Canada). To see current international ATL legal actions underway in
the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Norway, France and elsewhere that utilize the public trust
doctrine, visit Global Legal Actions, OURCHILDREN’STRUST, https://www.ourchildrenstrust
.org/global-legal-actions [https://perma.cc/CYT6-3PLV] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
27 Kelly, supra note 21, at 207.
28 Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 23, at 35–36 (discussing how post-Roman Venetian jurists
and others reframed Roman common law doctrines such as the public trust doctrine in
order to enhance individual rights and state sovereignty).
29 See id.
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did in ancient Rome. In the United States, even two different states might
have different interpretations of what constitutes “normative” sovereignty
over ecological resources, depending on that state’s sociopolitical history
and geography, or perhaps its vulnerability to climate change. To that
point, some states today have expanded the public trust through consti-
tutional amendment,30 statute,31 or, as has traditionally been the case,
through common law32 to protect additional public trust resources and
uses. Many states have expanded their definition of the public trust to
specifically reflect ecological ideals.33 For example, Pennsylvania’s public
trust has been embraced in an amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion that commands:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to
the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic
values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural
resources are the common property of all the people, includ-
ing generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources,
the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for
the benefit of all the people.34
That constitutional expression of Pennsylvania’s enhanced public
trust doctrine was put to the test in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth,
where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down portions of the
Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act that were incompatible with the duties of the
state under that constitutional amendment.35 The court then expanded
30 See generally Kacy Manahan, Comment: The Constitutional Public Trust Doctrine, 49
ENV’T L. 263 (2019) (analyzing state constitutional provisions and decisions that define
and protect the public trust).
31 See generally Robin K. Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust
Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public
Trust, 37 ECOLOGYL.Q.53(2010)[hereinafter Craig, Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines]
(compiling state statutes that define the public trust doctrine in nineteen western states);
Robin K. Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: Clas-
sifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENV’T L. REV.
1 (2007) [hereinafter Craig, Eastern States’ Public Trust Doctrines] (compiling state
statutes that define the public trust doctrine in thirty-one eastern states).
32 See generally Robin K. Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State
Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781 (2010) (detailing the evolution
of the public trust doctrine in the common law of several states and the potential to
utilize the public trust doctrine to address climate change).
33 See generally id.; Manahan, supra note 30.
34 PA. CONST. art. I § 27 (emphasis added).
35 Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 1000 (Pa. 2013).
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Pennsylvania’s public trust even further when it held that “the concept
of public natural resources [that the state is obligated to protect] includes
not only state-owned lands, waterways, and mineral reserves, but also
resources that implicate the public interest, such as ambient air, surface
and groundwater, wild flora, and fauna (including fish).”36
It is rare for a state’s public trust doctrine to be defined as broadly
as Pennsylvania’s.37 It is also rare that a state should include its definition
of the public trust in its constitution.38 Traditionally, the public trust is
defined through common law rather than statutory or constitutional law,
which offers less protection to public trust assets because common law
can be superseded by legislation or an appellate court decision.39 It is
worth noting when a state chooses to protect its public trust through
constitutional provision, because constitutional supremacy offers signifi-
cant protection to public trust assets that cannot be superseded by any
state law.40 Due to differences in approaches across states, the breadth
of each state’s definition of the public trust and the degree to which it is
protected can vary wildly.41 Therefore, whether a certain resource (such
as the atmosphere) may be considered protected under the public trust
must be analyzed on a state-by-state basis.
Thus, it has been established that the public trust doctrine cur-
rently applies varying levels of natural resource protection at the state
level; but what about at the federal level? Is there such a thing as a federal
public trust? Many have argued that there is.42 Nevertheless, federal
36 Id. at 954–56.
37 For details on how each state defines its public trust, see generally Craig, Western
States’ Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 31; Craig, Eastern States’ Public Trust Doctrines,
supra note 31.
38 Manahan, supra note 30, at 266, 268 (noting that while “[a] number of states [have]
recognized the [public trust doctrine] in the language of their constitutions,” the doctrine
largely remains characterized as a common law doctrine).
39 Id.
40 For example, in In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 445 (Haw. 2000), the
Hawaii Supreme Court interpreted its Constitution to include “the air, running water, the
sea, and consequently the shores of the sea” in accordance with the definition of the public
trust doctrine in the Roman Institutes of Justinian. Having protected its public trust through
constitutional law and supreme court interpretation of that law, Hawaii is therefore in
a better position to defend its public trust. For more on this, see infra Section III.B.
41 See generally Craig, Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 31; Craig, Eastern
States’ Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 31.
42 See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Lynn S. Schaffer, The Federal Public Trust Doctrine:
Misinterpreting Justice Kennedy and Illinois Central Railroad, 45 ENV’T L. 399, 421–30
(2015) (finding evidence for a federal public trust in federal case law and federal statutes);
Kelly, supra note 21, at 217–18 (arguing that the public trust doctrine’s arrival in the United
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case law is against the recognition of a federal public trust.43 In the 1892
case of Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, the United States Supreme
Court asserted in dicta that the public trust was strictly a matter of state
law.44 Based on that statement, the majority of courts today assume that
the public trust is strictly a matter of state law, while no binding precedent
actually exists to affirm that assumption, or alternatively, to support
that the state public trust has a federal public trust counterpart.45
With so many variables and unknowns, it is no wonder that “the
law involving the public trust doctrine has been recognized by [many]
courts as having become unnecessarily complex.”46
B. Atmospheric Trust Litigation: A “Liberated” Approach to the
Public Trust
Atmospheric Trust Litigation is a litigation strategy that is best
described as a “liberated” approach to the public trust doctrine.47 ATL’s
development was motivated by the increasingly popular theory that unen-
cumbered federal agency discretion in environmental regulation has
allowed for abuse of that discretion.48 Abuse of discretion has subsequently
resulted in excessive permitting, decreased societal benefits, narrow
approaches to broad ecological problems, and a great lack of agency ac-
countability.49 Accordingly, proponents of ATL argue that environmental
States legal system through the equal footing doctrine suggests that a federal public trust
exists); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the
Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENV’T L. 425, 458–59 (1989) (suggesting
that the public trust might inherently exist in the Constitution).
43 See Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 13 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d 561 Fed. Appx. 7
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding that a federal public trust could not exist because the Supreme
Court has declared the public trust a doctrine of state law). But see Blumm & Schaffer,
supra note 42, at 399 (arguing that in Alec L., the court based its holding on mere dicta
rather than binding precedent and illustrating that the Supreme Court’s history with the
public trust doctrine has been consistently misinterpreted by lower courts).
44 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892).
45 See, e.g., PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012) (stating in dicta that “the
public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law”). But cf. Light v. United States, 220
U.S. 523, 537 (1911) (finding that federal public lands “are held in trust for the people of the
whole country”). See generally Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 42 (compiling cases that
have followed the Illinois Central Railroad court’s dicta as if it were binding precedent).
46 Gwathmey v. State, 464 S.E.2d 674, 688 (N.C. 1995).
47 See generally Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical
Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185 (1980) (suggesting the modernization, “liberation”,
of the public trust to protect ecological values).
48 See generally NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 10.
49 See generally id.
2020] AFTER JULIANA 227
regulation today exists in an “administrative state” which has skewed the
balance of separation of powers too far in favor of the executive branch,
allowing political and industrial influence over agency decisions with few,
if any, legal consequences.50
ATL seeks to circumvent the issues inherent in the administrative
state, and attempts to force the judiciary to assume it’s critical role as an
institutional check on executive agency discretion while disincentivizing the
court’s current trend of utilizing the administrative deference doctrine51 as
a scapegoat.52 To do so, ATL utilizes the public trust, as a recognized
foundational common law doctrine that the court is obligated to defend,
to contend that the federal government has a fiduciary duty to reduce car-
bon emissions to protect the atmosphere for current and future genera-
tions.53 The basic claims of the Atmospheric Trust Litigation strategy are
the following:
(1) the air and atmosphere, along with other vital natural
resources, are within the res of the public trust, and there-
fore subject to special sovereign obligations; (2) the legisla-
ture and its implementing agencies are public trustees; (3)
both present and future generations of the public are
beneficiaries of the public trust; (4) the government trustees
owe a fiduciary duty of protection against “substantial im-
pairment” of the air, atmosphere, and climate system, which
amounts to an affirmative duty to restore its balance; and
(5) courts have a duty to enforce these trust obligations.54
The use of the public trust doctrine to protect the greater envi-
ronment is clever to say the least. A trust framework provides citizen
beneficiaries with judicially enforceable rights that go beyond citizens’
political rights as general constituents.55 Furthermore, the definition of
50 See id. at 110–12.
51 See generally Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452
(1997); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
52 See NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 10, at 108–12.
53 See id. at 226–29.
54 Michael C. Blumm & Mary C. Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit”: Climate Change, Due
Process, and the Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 23 (2017).
55 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 76–84 (AM. L. INST. 2012) (detailing specific
duties of trusteeship); id. at §§ 93–98 (discussing judicial remedies for breach of trust); see
also NATURE’STRUST,supra note 10, at 165–87 (discussing the government’s unwavering
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“trust beneficiary” extends farther than the rights and interests of cur-
rent constituents—it also encompasses future interest holders, which forces
the government to recognize children and future (i.e., unborn) citizens as
beneficiary classes.56 If ATL’s public trust argument is supported, then
the judicial branch is obligated to uphold the effective management of
that public trust for citizens today and in consideration of citizens in the
future.57 Therefore, in effect, ATL’s “liberated approach” to the public
trust presents the court with an additional enforcement mechanism to
demand agency and legislative accountability outside of both the political
and administrative processes and protects the rights and interests of
those without political representation.58
In recent years, the use of ATL in environmental litigation has
been adopted by individuals and non-government organizations (“NGOs”)
alike, but none have utilized it so precisely and methodically as Our
Children’s Trust.59 Our Children’s Trust (“OCT”), a non-profit public in-
terest law firm, works exclusively to secure the legal rights of present
and future generations to a healthy atmosphere and stable climate.60
Since 2011, OCT has supported youth plaintiffs in ATL actions number-
ing over sixty state cases and petitions, filed throughout each of the fifty
states.61 After experiencing little success at the state level,62 Alec L. v.
obligation under the public trust to uphold fiduciary standards of protection and resto-
ration to the public’s inherited wealth of natural resource assets for current and future
generations of citizens).
56 NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 10, at 272–73. An interesting compounded result of this
framework considers the fact that corporations, by law, cannot be trust beneficiaries.
Therefore, the effects of Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (which arguably
created a “purchased democracy”), could be counterbalanced by the litigative power of the
federal public trust; so long as that public trust is democratically maintained through a
robust sphere of public control and right to self-determination. Id. at 273.
57 See id. (“Within this trust paradigm, a government’s legal duties also flow to children
and future citizens, both recognized as beneficiary classes.”).
58 See id. at 226–29 (discussing the judicial role in upholding the public trust and pro-
tecting trust rights of youth who are currently resorting to the use of ATL in the face of
climate change).
59 See generally OURCHILDREN’STRUST, https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org [https://perma
.cc/LZ45-ELE9] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
60 Our Mission, OURCHILDREN’STRUST, https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/mission-state
ment [https://perma.cc/PC6E-XZAA] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
61 See State Legal Actions, supra note 10.
62 See, e.g., Kanuk v. State, 335 P.3d 1088, 1103 (Alaska 2014) reh’g denied (Oct. 28, 2014);
Funk v. Wolf, 144 A.3d 228, 251–52 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016), aff’d 638 Pa. 726 (2017);
Svitak ex rel. Svitak v. State, 2013 WL 6632124, at *2–3 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2013).
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Jackson (later renamed Alec L. v. McCarthy) became the first ATL suit to
appear in federal court in 2012.63
In Alec L., five youth plaintiffs, represented by Julia Olsen of OCT,
brought a single claim against federal government agencies, seeking dec-
laratory and injunctive relief for the government’s failure to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions in violation of its fiduciary duty to protect and
preserve the atmosphere under the public trust doctrine.64 The District
Court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and noted
that the plaintiffs “cited no cases, and the Court [was] aware of none,
that have expanded the [public trust] doctrine to protect the atmosphere
or impose duties on the federal government.”65 On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit affirmed, citing the recent Supreme Court case PPL Montana,
LLC v. Montana, which the circuit court read to “repeatedly refer[] to
‘the’ public trust doctrine . . . directly and categorically reject[ing] any
federal constitutional foundation for that doctrine, without qualification
or reservation.”66
Learning from Alec L.’s mistakes, Juliana v. United States became
the second lawsuit to take ATL to federal court in 2015.67 The youth plain-
tiffs in Juliana sought declaratory relief finding that a federal public trust
exists in the atmosphere, inherent in a Fifth Amendment liberty interest,
that would protect present and future generations’ right to a livable
atmosphere.68 Additionally, they sought a declaration that the federal
government violated its fiduciary obligation under the trust by failing to
adequately address climate change and, in so doing, denied present and
future generations their due process right to a livable atmosphere.69 To
force the federal government to meet its alleged fiduciary duty, the
Juliana plaintiffs specifically asked the court for an injunction in manda-
mus, ordering the United States to take inventory of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions and to come up with a judicially enforceable plan to reduce
63 Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 13 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d 561 Fed. Appx. 7 (D.C.
Cir. 2014).
64 Id. at 12.
65 Id. at 13.
66 Alec L. v. McCarthy, 561 Fed. Appx. 7, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Montana, 565 U.S.
at 604 (“Under accepted principles of federalism, the States retain residual power to
determine the scope of the public trust over waters within their borders, while federal
law determines riverbed title under the equal footing doctrine.”)).
67 See generally Juliana Complaint, supra note 5.
68 See Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
69 Id.
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emissions by six percent each year to meet a target of 350 parts per
million of CO2 by 2050.70 Plaintiffs chose 350 parts per million because
“best science confirms that 350 ppm is the maximum safe level of atmo-
spheric CO2 required to restore a stable climate system.”71 Today, atmo-
spheric CO2 levels remain constant above 400 ppm.72 Time has run out,
and according to ATL proponents, “courts now [hold] the last—and
only—hope.”73
Juliana’s argument was not completely novel—it was built on the
backs of Alec L. and the state cases that came before it.74 Yet, as the
District Court of Oregon accurately explained, “[t]his [was] no ordinary
lawsuit.”75 Though Juliana possessed similarities to prior ATL cases both
in strategy and requested relief,76 Juliana’s substantive claims had the
potential to result in vastly different (and perhaps unexpected) con-
sequences. While state ATL cases argued for state courts to declare a state
public trust in the atmosphere, Juliana, like Alec L., advanced an argu-
ment for a federal public trust77 and requested that the federal court
recognize a constitutional due process right to a clean and healthy at-
mosphere under federal law.78 Where Alec L. lacked the constitutional hook
to allow subject matter jurisdiction in federal court, Juliana depended
entirely on that hook by substantiating a federal public trust claim
within the Fifth Amendment.79
70 See id.; Juliana Complaint, supra note 5, at 99.
71 Juliana Complaint, supra note 5, at 7.
72 Rebecca Lindsey, Climate Change: Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide, CLIMATE.GOV (Feb. 20,
2020), https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-at
mospheric-carbon-dioxide [https://perma.cc/84YX-9Q67].
73 NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 10, at 47.
74 See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
75 Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
76 Juliana requested similar remedies to state ATL counterparts, including a writ of
mandamus and declaratory relief affirming the existence of a public trust extended to the
atmosphere, as well as a substantive due process right to a livable climate for future gen-
erations. Juliana’s case strategies are also similar to prior cases, which include interpretivist
and textualist approaches to constitutional law shaded with appeals to natural law.
Compare Juliana Complaint, supra note 5, at 89, 97–99, with Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F.
Supp. 2d 11, 13–14 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d 561 Fed. Appx. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Kanuk v. State,
335 P.3d 1088, 1090–91 (Alaska 2014), reh’g denied (Oct. 28, 2014); Funk v. Wolf, 144
A.3d 228, 232–33 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016), aff’d 638 Pa. 726 (2017), and Svitak ex rel.
Svitak v. State, 2013 WL 6632124, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2013).
77 Compare Juliana Complaint, supra note 5, at 97–99, with Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 12.
78 See Juliana Complaint, supra note 5, at 89, 99.
79 Compare id. with Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 13–14.
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Citing Obergefell v. Hodges80 as evidence of the modern court’s
ability to declare a new fundamental due process right, alongside Massa-
chusetts v. EPA81 as precedential evidence of the court’s recent and nec-
essary activism in forcing the federal government to address climate
change, Juliana argued that federal courts must hold federal agencies
accountable for inadequate environmental protection in the face of climate
change—and put forth that declaring a federal public trust, inherent in
a newly recognized Fifth Amendment due process right, was the way to
do it.82 In a landmark decision, the District Court of Oregon’s Judge Ann
Aiken sided with the plaintiffs and declared a newly recognized funda-
mental due process right to a habitable climate and federal public trust
in the atmosphere.83
Juliana’s victory for ATL was short-lived. In January 2020, the
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded Juliana with instructions to
dismiss for lack of standing.84 The court spent very little time affirming
injury and causation; it found that the injuries of at least some plaintiffs
were clearly concrete and particularized and that the causal chain was
sufficiently established, with 50 years of federal policies and direct federal
actions that at the very least created a genuine factual dispute as to
whether the government’s actions were a substantial factor in causing
climate change-related injury.85
The sole issue was redressability.86 The court contrasted Juliana
from Massachusetts v. EPA, stating that standing requirements for state
procedural rights (which are relaxed) substantially differ from standing
requirements for individual substantive rights (which are not relaxed).87
Invoking separation of powers, the court found that ordering, designing,
supervising, or implementing any comprehensive scheme to phase out fossil
fuel emissions and draw down excess atmospheric CO2 through injunc-
tive relief went far beyond the authority of the court.88 Additionally, the
80 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015) (“[W]hen the rights of persons are
violated, ‘the Constitution requires redress by the courts,’ notwithstanding the more gen-
eral value of democratic decisionmaking. This holds true even when protecting individual
rights affects issues of the utmost importance and sensitivity.”).
81 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 499 (2007).
82 See generally Juliana Complaint, supra note 5.
83 See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250, 1259 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d, 947
F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
84 Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1175 (9th Cir. 2020).
85 Id. at 1169.
86 Id. at 1171–72.
87 Id. at 1171.
88 Id. at 1171–73.
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court could not award the plaintiff’s requested declaration of a constitu-
tional right to a livable climate, because psychic satisfaction alone would
not sufficiently redress the injury of climate change.89 Without a guiding
constitutional directive or legal standard to guide it, the court couldn’t
exercise its equitable powers.90
The Juliana decision leaves ATL litigants with two important
takeaways. First, the question of whether there exists a constitutional
right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life remains open.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the court explicitly refused to
classify the case as involving a political question,91 which means that
Juliana’s claims remain relevant and potentially justiciable, so long as
the bar to standing can be lowered.
II. FORTIFYING FEDERALISM: THE NEED TO REINVENT ATL
While the Ninth Circuit’s decision leaves hope for ATL to return
to federal court and fight another day, Juliana’s claims will not give ATL
litigants the remedy that they seek, because the federal public trust argu-
ment proffered in Juliana presents a significant issue: Should future
ATL plaintiffs recycle Juliana’s claims and manage to succeed in their pub-
lic trust claim but fail in tying that claim to due process, federal preemp-
tion might apply to the public trust. Before addressing how best to bring
a new ATL suit that will meet the court’s standing requirements, ATL
proponents must address the issue of preemption and how to avoid it.
A. Preventing Preemption
While many legal scholars have discussed the potential for dis-
placement of public trust claims in federal ATL,92 none have focused
explicitly on the potential for federal preemption of state public trusts.
89 Id. at 1170.
90 Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1175 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Rucho v. Common
Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019)) (noting that “failure of political will does not justify
unconstitutional remedies”).
91 Id. at 1175 n.9 (explicitly stating that: “we do not find this to be a political question”).
92 See, e.g., Lynn S. Schaffer, Pulled from Thin Air: The (Mis)Application of Statutory
Displacement to a Public Trust Claim in Alec v. Jackson, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 169,
170 (2015) (arguing that a federal public trust would not be displaced by statutory
structures such as the Clean Air Act); Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public
Trust: The Law’s DNA, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 281, 300 (2014).
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The basis for both displacement and preemption can be found in the
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.93 Though the two are commonly con-
flated, preemption and displacement are doctrinally distinct.94
Displacement occurs when federal statutory law speaks directly
to an issue previously governed by federal common law.95 In that case, the
court-made rule is said to be “displaced” by an act of Congress.96 The
doctrine of displacement primarily exists to maintain separation of
powers.97 That is, the courts must yield to the decisions of elected officials
in Congress and the executive when a law regarding an issue that was
formerly governed through court decisions steps in to govern that issue.98
Preemption, on the other hand, occurs when a state law is “super-
seded” by federal law.99 Its purpose is to maintain federalism, or the
relationship and distribution of power between the states and federal
government.100 The Supreme Court has interpreted the Supremacy Clause
to allow for multiple types of preemption.101 This Note does not seek to
outline the potential for any particular type of preemption that might
apply to the public trust as a result of ATL; it only seeks to highlight the
inherent danger that preemption may occur.
93 U.S. CONST. art. VI (stating that the Constitution “shall be the supreme law of the land”
and that “the judges in every state shall be bound thereby”—referring to displacement—
“anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding”—
referring to preemption).
94 See John Wood, Easier Said Than Done: Displacing Public Nuisance When States Sue
for Climate Change Damages, 41 ENV’T L. REP. 10316, 10321–22 (2011) (explaining the






100 Wood, supra note 94, at 10321.
101 See Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (“Under
the Supremacy Clause, federal law may supersede state law in several different ways.
First, when acting within constitutional limits, Congress is empowered to preempt state
law by so stating in express terms. In the absence of express pre-emptive language,
Congress’ intent to pre-empt all state law in a particular area may be inferred where the
scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for supplementary state regulation. Preemption of
a whole field also will be inferred where the field is one in which the federal interest is
so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state
laws on the same subject. Even where Congress has not completely displaced state
regulation in a specific area, state law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts
with federal law. . . . We have held repeatedly that state laws can be pre-empted by
federal regulations as well as by federal statutes.”) (quotations and citations omitted).
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Preemption is a doctrine that is highly deferential to the federal
government, so much so that “[e]ven where Congress has not completely
displaced state regulation in a specific area,” state law can be nullified
if “the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”102
Climate change is a massive and wicked problem ripe for dominant federal
interest. Under a comprehensive scheme or on-point statute meant to
combat climate change, such as the Clean Air Act,103 a recognized federal
public trust at federal common-law that is then displaced could reason-
ably be read to later preempt a state public trust action in federal court.104
Scholars and ATL proponents alike have argued that the public
trust is protected from displacement (and presumably, preemption) if it
is attached to a substantive due process right, as Juliana plaintiffs re-
cently argued.105 However, the current make-up of the Supreme Court
renders it unlikely that the Court will acknowledge a new constitutional
liberty interest to a life-sustaining climate system.106 Recognition of a
federal public trust without attaching it to the Constitution puts both
state public trust and federal public trust (should one be found to exist)
in jeopardy of being displaced and preempted by the federal legislative
and executive branches.
Without the constitutional hook that would otherwise protect a fed-
eral public trust from displacement or preemption, federal environmental
statutes could supersede state public trust law, negatively impact state
sovereignty, and blur the line between state and federal authority on
102 Id.
103 See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 411 (“[T]he plaintiffs [cannot]
state a federal common-law claim for curtailment of greenhouse gas emissions because
of [defendants] contribution to global warming. Any such claim would be displaced by the
federal legislation authorizing EPA to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions.”).
104 For an overview of three recent state common-law nuisance claims that have at-
tempted to proceed in federal court under state claims without preemption or displace-
ment, see Rachel Rothschild, State Nuisance Law and the Climate Challenge to Federalism,
27 N.Y.U. ENV’T. L.J. 412, 422–24 (2019).
105 See, e.g., Schaffer, supra note 92, at 190–95; Torres & Bellinger, supra note 92, at
300–01. See also Juliana Complaint, supra note 5, at 99.
106 See, e.g., Charles Tiefer, Kavanaugh Threatens to Become a Potent Anti-Environment
Justice, FORBES (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/charlestiefer/2018/09/10
/kavanaugh-threatens-to-become-a-potent-anti-environment-justice/#6834efbc186f
[https://perma.cc/UL6G-BFQB]; John Echeverria, The Fate of Environmental Law in a
Trump-Era Supreme Court, SCI. AM. BLOGS (Feb. 8, 2017), https://blogs.scientificameri
can.com/guest-blog/the-fate-of-environmental-law-in-a-trump-era-supreme-court/ [https://
perma.cc/5Q3H-W2TZ].
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state property issues.107 Ultimately, that could impair states’ abilities to
regulate the use of public trust resources and could eliminate state-
specific cultural and historical practices regarding what is recognized or
not recognized as part of each state’s public trust. In the worst-case sce-
nario (and counter to ATL litigants’ objective to secure a cleaner environ-
ment) this could result in environmental decision-making that is desensi-
tized to enhanced values that states place on natural resources.108
In times of political impasse on climate change at the federal
level, citizens will look to their states to employ the police power and to
courts to utilize the common law, to protect our general welfare.109 Dis-
placement of a state’s ability to utilize common law claims under the
public trust at the federal level, and preemption of state public trusts
could cripple a state’s response to the climate crisis.110
It is in ATL plaintiffs’ interest to recognize that states should
maintain the greatest possible degree of state sovereignty over public
trust resources in the current administrative state. Sovereignty over the
public trust can only occur under the state public trust doctrine and with
the added benefits of our existing framework of cooperative federalism.
Therefore, the ATL strategy that was put forth in Juliana should be
reworked to anticipate and guard against the potential consequence of
preemption that could otherwise act against ATL plaintiffs’ ultimate
objective: securing a cleaner environment through functioning demo-
cratic processes and the power of the courts.111
B. A Case Study in Nuisance
In American Electric Power Company v. Connecticut (“AEP”), eight
states and New York City joined together to sue fossil-fuel-fired power
companies under a federal common law claim of public nuisance.112 A
107 Cf. Schaffer, supra note 92, at 191.
108 See id. at 94, 96; cf. Richard O. Brooks, A Constitutional Right to a Healthful Envi-
ronment, 16 VT. L. REV. 1063, 1103–05 (1991) (arguing that states are best suited to define
and protect environmental rights and that state judges are more sensitive in weighing
the state’s environmental values).
109 Cf. Brooks, supra note 108, at 1103–05.
110 Cf. Wood, supra note 94, at 10322 (arguing that the doctrines of preemption and
displacement, contrary to how they have previously been wielded, “should have the effect
of making government work, rather than exacerbating vicious passivity in the face of
public danger”).
111 See, e.g., NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 10, at 226–29.
112 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 415 (2011).
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unanimous Supreme Court held that the Clean Air Act displaced the
plaintiffs’ claims and the suit was subsequently dismissed.113 In its analy-
sis, the Court differentiated between displacement and preemption. The
Court explained that “[l]egislative displacement of federal common law
does not require the same sort of evidence of a clear and manifest con-
gressional purpose demanded for preemption of state law.”114 The test for
when federal legislation displaces federal common law “is simply
whether the statute speaks directly to the question at issue.”115 Multiple
cases have similarly held that the federal common law of nuisance has
been displaced by environmental statutes administered by the EPA.116
In Alec L., the court held that “even if the public trust doctrine
had been a federal common law claim at one time, it has subsequently
been displaced by federal regulation, specifically the Clean Air Act.”117
Going further, the court stressed that the AEP decision mandated that
“the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal
common law right to seek abatement of carbon dioxide emissions from
fossil-fuel fired power plants.”118 This illustrates that if federal common
law nuisance claims can be displaced by the Clean Air Act in federal
court, so too can federal common law public trust claims.
The AEP Court made a point to note that the availability of a suit
under state common law depends upon the “preemptive effect” of the
federal act.119 That is, if a federal act evidences a clear and manifest
congressional purpose for preemption of state law, then all common law
suits, both state and federal, are unavailable.120 Many environmental
113 Id. at 413, 415 (Eight Justices took part in the unanimous decision; Sotomayor, J.,
abstained).
114 Id. at 423 (emphasis added).
115 Id. at 424 (quotations and citations omitted).
116 See, e.g., Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (Milwaukee II) (holding that
the Clean Water Act preempted the field of federal common law nuisance in suits regarding
water pollution); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 849 (9th
Cir. 2012) (holding that Section 202 of the Clean Air Act preempted federal common law
public nuisance claims that request an injunction for interference with the use and
enjoyment of one’s property caused by global warming); County of San Mateo v. Chevron
Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 937 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (noting that “federal common law is
displaced by the Clean Air Act not only when plaintiffs seek injunctive relief to curb
emissions but also when they seek damages for a defendant’s contribution to global
warming.”).
117 Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15–16 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d 561 Fed. Appx. 7
(D.C. Cir. 2014).
118 Id. (quoting Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011).
119 Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 429.
120 Id. (“[I]f a case should be resolved by reference to federal common law, state common
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statutes can be read to effectively “preempt the field.” For instance, the
court in Alec L. suggested that the Clean Air Act fully displaces any public
trust interest in atmospheric resources.121
As previously mentioned, many scholars have offered arguments
as to why displacement would not occur in the case of a federal public
trust.122 But to fully comprehend the dangers of preemption and displace-
ment, it is important to consider the order in which preemption and
displacement might occur and the effects of that order, which is where
the doctrine of preemption enters the frame. For example, if a federal
court were to recognize a federal public trust, that could result in pre-
emption of state public trusts in cases brought in federal court. Because
statutes such as the Clean Air Act are said to fully preempt the field of
federal common law claims, those environmental statutes would likely
then displace the federal public trust. Therefore, under this hypothetical,
claims that are brought under the state public trust in federal court would
be totally preempted by the Clean Air Act. As a result, plaintiffs would
have fewer options to sue in federal court. Additionally, plaintiffs might
have inadvertently sacrificed the role of state courts and legislatures in
cultivating public trusts that are unique to each states’ ecological values.
Preemption could effectively bind each state to federal decisions that
would have formerly been made by states in their sovereign capacity
relating to property, interests in a clean and healthy atmosphere, or
other uses and resources under state public trusts. For these reasons, the
goals of ATL and the historical purpose of the public trust doctrine would
be best achieved if the public trust remains an exclusive issue of state
law.
ATL litigants must be aware of the potential consequences of both
displacement and preemption and plan to avoid allowing the public trust
doctrine to deteriorate in any court of law. Total preemption of state
public trust claims in federal court could foreseeably occur if state com-
mon law is preempted by federal common law and subsequently displaced
by federal statute. If the public trust is meant to serve as a limitation on
government action that can be controlled by popular sovereignty, it
would be wise not to consolidate the entire power of the public trust in
law is preempted”) (citing Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellete, 479 U.S. 481, 488 (1987) (holding
that state common law nuisance is sometimes preempted by federal legislation) (internal
citations omitted)).
121 See Schaffer, supra note 92, at 169–70.
122 See, e.g., id. (arguing that a federal public trust would not be displaced by statutory
structures such as the Clean Air Act); Torres & Bellinger, supra note 92, at 300.
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the federal government when ATL was invented as a solution to combat
the federal administrative state in the first place.
C. Preserving Both ATL and Cooperative Federalism
Cooperative environmental federalism that allows for state com-
mon law approaches to combatting climate-related injuries would be at
stake if federal environmental common law is further recognized and
preempted by the Clean Air Act or other federal environmental statutes.
Because cooperative federalism remains the best available governance
strategy to combat climate change,123 any potential hindrance of that
governance strategy must be carefully considered.
This begs the question: why do ATL plaintiffs ask for a federal
public trust? Theoretically, any litigant who seeks a similar remedy to
ATL plaintiffs (a right to a clean and healthy environment and a court
order mandating emissions reductions) could simply ask the court to
create a Fifth Amendment due process right to a clean and healthy at-
mosphere.124 There is no absolute need to affirm the existence of a federal
public trust in order to reach a similar remedy. Furthermore, extensive
research provides a myriad of explanations why litigants should avoid
the federal public trust argument.125
As alluded to previously,126 ATL proponents likely ask for a fed-
eral public trust due to the fiduciary relationship that the public trust
123 William W. Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, Entrenchment, and the Climate Challenge,
2017 WIS.L.REV. 1037, 1113 (2017) (“Federal climate preemption and unitary regulatory
scheme arguments may make sense in an idealized world of perfect, stable legal commit-
ments, but in a real world pervaded by regulatory failure, reversal risks, and political
instability, such unitary preemptive regimes would undercut climate progress. . . .
Retaining room for state and local climate regulation and linked clean energy efforts
hedges regulatory risks. Such overlapping and potentially intertwined federal and state
regulation may . . . be the most effective way to ensure that a future federal climate law
or regulation under existing law will actually be implemented and endure despite on-
going political and legal contestation.”).
124 See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250, 1259 (D. Or. 2016).
125 See, e.g., Caroline Cress, It’s Time to Let Go: Why the Atmospheric Trust Won’t Help
the World Breathe Easier, 92 N.C. L. REV. 236, 264–69 (2013) (noting many drawbacks
to using the public trust to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions); James L. Huffman, Why
Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine Is Bad for the Public, 45 ENV’T L. 337, 376–77 (2015)
(arguing that expansion of the public trust doctrine erodes the rule of law); James L.
Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy,
19 ENV’T L. 527, 528 (1989) (claiming that public trust law “infringes upon vested private
property rights” and that an expansive public trust may be unconstitutional).
126 See discussion of trust relationship supra Section I.B.
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creates, which is a powerful tool to force government action.127 The avail-
able remedy in trust law—recognition of a traditional fiduciary relation-
ship between the citizens and government and judicial enforcement of
that relationship—is meant to serve as a limitation on government action
that can be controlled by popular sovereignty.128 That may be true—and
if it is, an effective public trust can only exist when the people maintain
that sovereignty. But the people’s sovereignty can shift in the sands of
politics and populism. Climate law must be able to respond quickly to
withstand those shifts. Quickly is not a word frequently associated with
the federal government, which is one reason that states are in the best
position to adapt laws to prepare for a future that is faced with climate
change.129
The public trust, a doctrine imbibed with great power and flexibil-
ity, is best utilized by the states in tandem with ground-floor environ-
mental regulation set by federal agencies, to promote efficient protection
of individuals’ and states’ rights to a clean and healthy environment. A
federal public trust need not exist to make an impact at the federal level.
The federal government remains obligated under multiple doctrines and
constitutional provisions, namely the Tenth Amendment,130 to not hinder
the protection of the state public trust. Underpinnings of Roman and
English law that inform the state public trust could support that argu-
ment without risking endangerment of state rights and cooperative
federalism as a result of federal public trust recognition and state public
trust preemption.
127 The public trust has been described as that which “weav[es] together two civic strands
of power and obligation,” thus embodying both a willful subjugation of individual
autonomy and authority through delegation of management from citizens to the federal
government, as well as an establishment of a fiduciary relationship between the gov-
ernment and the people, thereby protecting the political process from more powerful
interests. NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 10, at 129.
128 See supra Section I.B.
129 See, e.g., Craig, supra note 32, at 781 (arguing that public trust doctrines at the state
level “give willing states a legal vehicle for: (1) acknowledging climate change as a threat
to public resources; (2) continually reassessing the cumulative impacts climate change
is causing; (3) supporting fledgling adaptive management efforts by state agencies; and,
at the extreme, (4) engaging in judicial adaptive management, in the sense of rebalancing
private rights and public values in impacted aquatic resources, ecosystems, and
ecosystem services”).
130 U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.”).
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It is true that the public trust is an essential characteristic of a
functioning democracy,131 but a federal public trust would not be useful
in actualizing the protections and relationships of a fiduciary and benefi-
ciary, and in America’s unique system of cooperative federalism, this role
in upholding our functioning democracy belongs to the states. The federal
government is simply less equipped to uphold a fiduciary duty under the
public trust than the states, who have historically filled that fiduciary
role since the Illinois Central Railroad Co. decision.132
In conclusion, recognition of a federal public trust runs the risk
of preempting state law and could cause more harm to the goals of ATL
and historical purpose of the public trust doctrine than good, when alter-
native mechanisms to achieving the goals of ATL plaintiffs are available
using slightly different claims. ATL proponents must consider that
preemption and the resulting consolidation of authority in public trust
decision making in the federal government would likely result in less
protection through the political process than if the public trust remained
an issue of state law. In the end, a win for ATL under Juliana’s plead-
ings could result in a weaker public trust doctrine overall.
III. A MAP TO MASSACHUSETTS: UTILIZING SPECIAL SOLICITUDE
STATE STANDING TO CRAFT A NEW ATL STRATEGY
The future of ATL and the remedy it seeks to gain cannot be secured
under Juliana’s pleadings, but it also cannot be secured by Juliana’s
plaintiffs. That is, due to standing requirements, ATL is unlikely to suc-
ceed at the federal level in suits brought by individuals. This section
argues that the future of ATL is the responsibility of the states. To pro-
tect the public trust and secure the remedy sought by ATL plaintiffs,
state attorneys general should sue the federal government using a unique
ATL strategy: the state should seek to affirm the public trust in the at-
mosphere as a matter of state law while calling upon the Court to declare
a substantive due process right to a climate system capable of supporting
human life.133 Rather than basing a claim on the failure of the federal
government to act in its fiduciary capacity under a federal public trust,
131 NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 10, at 125.
132 See generally Craig, Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 31; Craig,
Eastern States’ Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 31.
133 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“due process is flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands”).
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the suit should instead be brought in the state’s quasi-sovereign capacity
under Fifth Amendment due process and the Tenth Amendment. The
state should claim that the federal government, in not effectively regulat-
ing CO2, is preventing the state from upholding its fiduciary duty under
the state public trust, especially to protected classes of citizens, such as
children.134 The state should then ask the federal court for an order in
mandamus compelling federal government action to more forcefully com-
bat climate change.
By couching the public trust claim in the context of preserving
federalism, the state public trust is protected, and the court maintains
its voice in ensuring that states can uphold their quasi-sovereign obliga-
tions under existing state public trusts. This strategy would enhance
environmental protection, protect the American system of cooperative
federalism and would limit neither the state nor federal government’s
role in protecting the atmosphere.
It is critical that a state be party to this case, because standing in
future ATL cases is sure to remain an issue.135 The doctrine of special
solicitude reduces standing requirements and allows a state to bring
forth a suit against the United States government on behalf of that state’s
citizens and it’s quasi-sovereign interests that are “independent of and
behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its do-
main.”136 Because the Ninth Circuit explicitly did not dismiss Juliana under
the political question doctrine,137 decreased requirements for standing,
which can be met following the Supreme Court’s decision involving spe-
cial solicitude state-standing in Massachusetts v. EPA, provides ATL
plaintiffs a path forward to meet standing requirements and fight in
federal court another day.138
134 In including the protection of special classes, a claim could also be brought under
Equal Protection, similar to another claim in Juliana. See Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1165.
135 See Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (allowing states to bring
forth claims on behalf of the citizens of the state); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,
518–20 (2007) (declaring enhanced “special solicitude” standing in cases brought by a
state in its quasi-sovereign interest).
136 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518–19 (quoting Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237). For
more on special solicitude in the environmental context, see generally Dorothea Allocca,
Special State Standing Is Environmental: Clarifying Massachusetts v. EPA, 45 WM. &
MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 193 (2020), also published in this Issue.
137 Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1175 n.9 (9th Cir.) (explicitly stating that: “we
do not find this to be a political question”).
138 See generally supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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A. State Standing
Each plaintiff that brings forth a suit must meet the three require-
ments of standing: injury in fact, causation, and redressability.139 How-
ever, standing requirements become more complex in cases that involve
a state as a plaintiff.140 For a state to have standing to bring a suit in fed-
eral court, it must prove that it has one of three types of state interests
in the litigation: proprietary,141 sovereign,142 or quasi-sovereign.143 Precedent
in Pennsylvania v. New Jersey informs us that “a State has standing to
sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and
it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citi-
zens.”144 Therefore, a state could not succeed in merely joining an ATL
suit that is already underway. The state must bring the suit on its own.
“Quasi-sovereign” is defined in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper.145
That case involved a suit by the state of Georgia against copper compa-
nies in a neighboring state.146 Georgia sought to enjoin the companies
from discharging noxious gases that threatened the environment in five
Georgia counties.147 The Supreme Court held that Georgia “ha[d] an in-
terest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth
and air within its domain. It ha[d] the last word as to whether its moun-
tains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe
pure air.”148 This interest, the court held, was within the State’s quasi-
sovereign capacity to protect.149
139 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
140 See Shannon M. Roesler, State Standing to Challenge Federal Authority in the Modern
Administrative State, 91 WASH.L.REV. 637, 639 (2016) (“federal standing doctrine is notori-
ously unclear about the extent to which governments, and in particular the states, have
constitutional standing to litigate questions of governmental authority in federal courts.”).
141 A proprietary state interest “is analogous to private common law interests (state
property and contracts, for example), which have long been recognized as legally jus-
ticiable.” Id. at 640.
142 A sovereign interest involves a state’s interest in its ability to govern; in other words,
a state’s interest in its jurisdiction, in terms of geographical scope as well as authority.
Id. at 640, 672.
143 A state acts in its quasi-sovereign capacity when it acts to protect the rights of its
citizens, as Massachusetts did in Massachusetts v. EPA. Id. at 676. Sovereign and quasi-
sovereign interests are at times difficult to distinguish from one another. Id. at 640.
144 426 U.S. 660, 665 (1976) (emphasis added).
145 206 U.S. at 237.
146 Id. at 236.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 237.
149 Id.
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In Massachusetts v. EPA, states, local governments, and environ-
mental organizations challenged EPA’s decision not to regulate green-
house gas emissions from new motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act.150
The Court held that Massachusetts met standing requirements because
it held “a special position and interest” as a sovereign state whose physical
interest in the land within its borders would be actually and imminently
affected by the federal government’s inaction.151 Similar to the Ninth
Circuit’s findings in Juliana, the Supreme Court in Massachusetts found
clear evidence of injury and causation between federal government inac-
tion and climate change, sufficient to meet those requirements of stand-
ing.152 The Court found that Massachusetts had a right to protect its
concrete interests and reiterated “the special position and interest of
Massachusetts,” holding that “[i]t is of considerable relevance that the
party seeking review here is a sovereign State.”153
Thus, the doctrine of special solicitude authorizes special standing
for state governments to bring forth a case when the state acts in a
quasi-sovereign capacity to directly protect the well-being and best in-
terests of its citizens.154 As applied to ATL, and similar to in Massachusetts
v. EPA, a state bringing suit against the federal government for failure to
adequately protect the interests of the state and its citizens would be an
example of that state acting in a sovereign capacity to protect its own in-
terests under the Tenth Amendment, as well as in a quasi-sovereign capac-
ity to protect the interests of its citizens under the Fifth Amendment.155
If a state were to bring a federal suit in such capacities, it would qualify for
special solicitude and thus a federal court would lower the bar to standing,
increasing the likelihood that the ATL suit would be allowed to proceed.156
B. Hawaii v. United States: A Hypothetical ATL Suit
So far, no state has attempted to bring forth an ATL suit against the
United States. As discussed supra, public trust assets are likely to receive
the greatest degree of protection when codified in a state constitution.157
Of the state constitutions that include the public trust, few remain airtight;
150 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 505.
151 Id. at 498.
152 Compare id. at 521, 523, with Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1168–69 (9th
Cir. 2020).
153 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518.
154 See id. at 520.
155 See id.
156 See id.
157 See supra Section I.A.
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for example, the Pennsylvania Court that decided Robinson Township,
discussed infra, previously interpreted that state’s constitutionally pro-
tected public trust in such a way that weakened the Amendment.158 Other
states have similarly faced problems with their own courts diminishing
the value of the constitutional protections to be afforded to the trust.159 The
state that brings forth the next ATL suit should be the state that offers
the greatest degree of protection to its public trust resources. That will
give ATL proponents the strongest argument that the federal govern-
ment is infringing on that state’s reserved Tenth Amendment powers.
Hawaii fits that bill.160 Hawaii amended its Constitution in 1972
to include the public trust in article XI, section 9:
For the benefit of present and future generations, the State
and its political subdivisions shall conserve and protect
Hawaii’s natural beauty and all natural resources, including
land, water, air, minerals and energy sources, and shall pro-
mote the development and utilization of these resources in
a manner consistent with their conservation and in fur-
therance of the self-sufficiency of the State. All public
natural resources are held in trust by the State for the
benefit of the people.161
Since the time of its enactment, no court decision in the state of
Hawaii has undercut or diminished the value of that Amendment in any
way. In fact, the Supreme Court of Hawaii has recently expanded its
interpretation of Hawaiian citizens’ public trust rights under article XI,
section 9 of the Hawaii Constitution even further.162
Because of the expansive nature of Hawaii’s public trust, it could
easily be argued that in Hawaii, a state public trust exists in the atmo-
sphere.163 If the state of Hawaii were to bring an ATL suit against the
158 See Commonwealth v. Nat’l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588, 588 (Pa.
1973).
159 See, e.g., Svitak ex rel. Svitak v. State, 178 Wash. App. 1020 (2013) (dismissing an ATD
suit for failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction despite the fact that
Washington gave enhanced protection to the public trust through nonjudicial means).
160 See generally Kylie Wha Kyung Wager, In Common Law We Trust: How Hawai’i’s
Public Trust Doctrine Can Support Atmospheric Trust Litigation to Address Climate Change,
20 HASTINGS W.NW.J.ENV’T L.&POL’Y 55 (2014) (detailing why and how Hawaii’s public
trust doctrine is perfectly situated to support ATL).
161 HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9.
162 See id.; In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 443–44 (Haw. 2000).
163 See Wager, supra note 160, at 83.
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federal government to protect Hawaiians’ public trust in the atmosphere
for future generations, a federal court would be more inclined to declare
a substantive due process right to a clean and livable atmosphere. Though
a court may be tempted to preempt Hawaiian constitutional law under
the Supremacy Clause,164 the Tenth Amendment offers protection to those
reserved powers of the state that protect the interests of its citizens through
the state’s police power.165 Hence, Hawaii has a good chance of judicially
forcing federal government action while avoiding preemption of the state
public trust, thus fulfilling the ultimate goals of ATL without any of the
potential disadvantages associated with previous ATL litigation.
Just as previous ATL cases utilize interpretivist and textualist
approaches to make their arguments, shaded with appeals to natural
law,166 the same devices can be used here: When the federal government
prevents a state such as Hawaii from effectuating its fiduciary duty to
enforce a livable climate in Hawaii through the state’s Tenth Amend-
ment police power, the federal government infringes upon more than the
plain meaning of the state’s police power; it infringes upon the ability of
the state to effectively function as a sovereign. It is the duty of the state
to uphold these fundamental, bedrock principles of law for the protection
of its citizens.167 If Hawaii were to bring a suit against the federal gov-
ernment, it should force the federal government to recognize and appreci-
ate that duty and would protect the sovereignty of both states and citi-
zens while simultaneously providing a remedy for ATL plaintiffs.168
CONCLUSION
To achieve the long-term goal of ATL litigants, a case should be
brought by a state under the doctrine of special solicitude in federal court.
164 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
165 See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the states respectively,
or to the people.”).
166 See supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing the similarities between argu-
ments used in Juliana and prior ATL cases).
167 See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
168 Though beyond the scope of this Note, the application of this strategy to current issues
in environmental federalism beyond ATL merits further discussion. For more on this, see
generally Allocca, supra note 136.
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The state should bring forth claims in its quasi-sovereign capacity, under
Fifth Amendment substantive due process, the Tenth Amendment, and
the state public trust.169 The state should ask for a declaration that the
public trust exists as an element of state sovereignty under the Tenth
Amendment and that a Fifth Amendment right to a livable climate exists
in the atmosphere.170 Further, the state should argue that the federal
government is preventing that state from meeting its fiduciary duty to
citizens under the trust beneficiary framework and unconstitutionally
denying the right to a livable climate to its citizens under the Fifth Amend-
ment.171 The state should then ask the court to order an injunction in
mandamus, compelling the federal government to make substantial efforts
to reduce CO2 emissions to atmospheric levels under 350 parts per million,
which will decrease future impacts of global climate change that will
otherwise disproportionately impact future generations.172
This ATL strategy will advance cooperative environmental feder-
alism, protect individual rights to the public trust under state law, and
allow for greater regulation of greenhouse gas emissions at both the state
and federal level.173 By placing our state public trust in the hands of the
courts while protecting the trust from becoming consumed by the federal
administrative state, we validate the court’s role in our system of checks
and balances. This strategy is consistent with the malleable historical
background of the public trust and aligns with what is known of the public
trust’s original goals: upholding sovereignty, individual rights, and public
autonomy over public resources.174 While the loss in Juliana was bitter-
sweet, hope for ATL—and what it stands for—is not lost.
[T]ake solace that “the arc of the moral universe is long, but
it bends towards justice.” The denial of an individual,
constitutional right—though grievous and harmful—can
be corrected in the future, even if it takes 91 years. And that
possibility provides hope for future generations.175
169 See supra Parts II–III.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 See supra Sections I.B–III.B.
173 See supra Sections I.B–C.
174 See supra Section I.A.
175 Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1191 (9th Cir. 2020) (Stanton, J., dissenting)
(quoting Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Remaining Awake Through a Great Revolution,
Address at the National Cathedral, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 31, 1968)).
